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GOVERNMENT CONTRACTS-DISCRETIONARY
WAIVER OF THE THIRTY-DAY TIME
LIMIT ON APPEALS

One traditional element of certainty in the law of government
contracts has been that the "final decision" of the contracting officer in a dispute arising under the contract is conclusive if not appealed from within thirty days by the contractor. In several recent
decisions,1 however, the Court of Claims has held that boards of
contract appeals must exercise discretion to waive untimeliness
and to consider entertaining on their merits late appeals. This the
boards have refused to do;2 the result is a perplexing stalemate between the appeals boards and the reviewing court. This Comment
examines the positions of the Court of Claims and the appeals
boards with respect to the authority of the boards to waive the
thiry day requirement, and considers possible solutions to this conflict and to the problem confronting a contractor who files a late
appeal.
I.

THE CONTRACT APPEALS MECHANISM

A. Appeal and Review
One of the boilerplate provisions in government contracts is
the clause entitled "Disputes," which provides for the referral of
disputes between the contracting parties to an administrative tribunal.3 The clause by its terms applies to "any dispute of fact
1. Monroe M. Tapper and Associates v. United States, 458 F.2d 66
(1972); Maney Aircraft Parts, Inc. v. United States, 453 F.2d 1260 (1972).
2. See, e.g., Maney Aircraft Parts, Inc., ASBCA No. 14363, 72-1 BCA
9449 (1972); Maitland Brothers, ASBCA No. 6607, 66-1 BCA 5416 (1966).
3. The "Disputes" clause set forth in the Armed Services Procurement Regulations (ASPR) is representative of those prescribed for other
government agencies:
(a) Except as otherwise provided in this contract, any dispute concerning a question of fact arising under this contract
which is not disposed of by agreement shall be decided by the
Contracting Officer, who shall reduce his decision to writing and
mail or otherwise furnish a copy thereof to the contractor. The
decision of the Contracting Officer shall be final and conclusive,
unless within 30 days from the date of receipt of such copy, the
Contractor mails or otherwise furnishes to the Contracting Officer a written appeal addressed to the Secretary. The decision of
the Secretary or his duly authorized representative for the determination of such appeals shall be final and conclusive unless determined by a court of competent jurisdiction to have been fraudulent, or capricious, or arbitrary, or so grossly erroneous as necessarily to imply bad faith, or not supported by substantial evidence.

arising under the contract. ' 4 Disputes arising "under the contract" concern entitlement to relief provided by some express provision of the contract (as opposed, for instance, to breach claims,
which are based on rights arising by operation of law from violation of the contract.) 5 By signing a contract containing the
"Disputes" clause a contractor agrees to submit any dispute "arising under the contract" to the government's contracting officer.
The contracting officer then renders a "final decision," a copy of
which is sent to the contractor. Again by virtue of the "Disputes"
clause, the decision of the contracting officer is conclusive unless
within thirty days 6 the contractor files a written appeal to the appropriate board of contract appeals.7 If timely appeal is taken, the
appeals board, after a hearing which may either be oral or "on the
record," renders a written decision containing fact findings and
legal conclusions.
Once a decision has been rendered by the appeals board the
contractor may seek relief in the courts from an unfavorable determination. Judicial review of the decisions of appeals boards under
the Disputes clause is authorized by the Wunderlich Act.8 The Act
provides that board fact-findings are conclusive unless fraudulent,
arbitrary, or not supported by substantial evidence; on the other
hand, the courts are entirely free to overturn appeals board determinations of questions of law, which are open to independent
judicial consideration.9 However, the reviewing court is confined
In connection with any appeal proceeding under this clause, the
Contractor shall be afforded an opportunity to be heard and to
offer evidence in support of his appeal. Pending final decision of
a dispute hereunder, the Contractor shall proceed diligently with
the performance of the contract and in accordance with the Contracting Officer's decision.
(b) This "Disputes" clause does not preclude consideration
of law questions in connection with decisions provided for in paragraph (a) above: provided, That nothing in this contract shall
be construed as making final the decision of any administrative
official, representative, or board on a question of law.
32 C.F.R. § 7-103.12 (1958).
4. See "Disputes" clause quoted in note 3 supra.
5. United States v. Utah Construction & Mining Co., 384 U.S. 394
(1966). See Sachter, Resolution of Disputes Under United States Government Contracts: Problems and Proposals,2 PuB. CONTRAcTs L.J. 363 (1970).
6. The 30 day period begins to run from receipt by the contractor of
the "final decision." See, e.g., Guiliani Contracting Co., Inc. GSBCA 1060,
1964 BCA, Par. 4137 (1964).
7. The "Disputes" clause specifies appeal to the department head "or
his duly authorized representative." The department heads have delegated their authority to decide such disputes to the various contract appeals
boards, of which there are many, the oldest and most important of these
being the Armed Services Board of Contract Appeals (ASBCA), See 32
C.F.R. App. A, Part I.; Shedd, Disputes and Appeals: The Armed Services
Board of Contract Appeals, 29 LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS 39
(1964).
8. 41 U.S.C. §§ 321-22 (1964). No authority for review of appeals
board decisions is conferred by the Administrative Procedure Act, which
by its own terms does not apply to such disputes. 5 U.S.C. § 551(1) (E)
(1966).
9. See, e.g., Drake Co. v. United States, 194 Ct. Cl. 549, 439 F.2d 169
(1971).
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to the administrative record for all disputes within the scope of
the Disputes clause and cannot consider the evidence de novo, regardless whether the dispute primarily involves questions of law.' 0
If the administrative record proves to be inadequate for the court's
purposes, the court may suspend its proceedings to allow the appeals board to make such further findings as may be necessary to
correct the deficiencies in the record." ' It is important to note
that the Court of Claims-which has jurisdiction to review contract
appeals board decisions by virtue of its Tucker Act 12 authority to
render money judgments on contract claims against the United
States--does not have "remand" power. That is, in a case where
the administrative record is deficient the Court of Claims can suspend its proceedings to allow the parties to petition the appeals
board to retake jurisdiction, but it can not address an order to the
3
appeals board compelling it to do what the court requires.'
B. Exhaustion
The Court of Claims will not entertain a claim "arising under
the contract" until the contractor first exhausts the administrative
remedies set forth in the "Disputes" clause.' 4 The exhaustion requirement in government contracts law is more than merely a
10. United States v. Anthony Grace & Sons, Inc., 384 U.S. 424 (1966);
United States v. Utah Construction & Mining Co., 384 U.S. 394 (1966);
United States v. Bianchi & Co., 373 U.S. 709 (1963); Cuneo and Anthony,
Beyond Bianchi: The Impact of Utah and Grace on Judicial Review of
Contract Appeals Boards' Decisions, 55 GEo. L.J. 602 (1967); Sachter, The
Court of Claims and the Wunderlich Act: Trends in Judicial Review, 1966
DuKE L.J. 372 (1966).
11. See cases cited in note 10 supra.
12. Ch. 359, 24 Stat. 505 (1887), as amended (codified in scattered
sections of 28 U.S.C.); 28 U.S.C. § 1491 (1970). The Federal District Courts
have concurrent jurisdiction with the Court of Claims over contract claims
against the United States when the claims do not exceed $10,000. 28 U.S.C.
§ 1346 (1966).
13. United States v. Jones, 336 U.S. 641, 670 (1949) (dictum); Anthony Grace & Sons, Inc. v. United States, 170 Ct. Cl. 688, 345 F.2d 808, 812
(1965), rev'd on other grounds, 384 U.S. 424 (1966); Frederick v. United
States, 150 Ct. Cl. 769, 776, 280 F.2d 844, 847 (1960); Suter v. United
States, 139 Ct. Cl. 466, 471, 153 F. Supp. 367, 369 (1957), cert. denied, 355
U.S. 926 (1958); Patterson v. United States, 115 Ct. Cl. 348, 353 (1950).
But see Jaffe, Remand Powers of the Court of Claims, 55 GEO. L.J. 444
(1966).
However, the District Courts, when exercising their concurrent
jurisdiction as to appeals under $10,000, do "remand" cases to contract appeals boards. Jaffe, Remand Powers of the Court of Claims, 55 GEo. L.J.
444, 450-52 (1966).
14. If the claim is not one "arising under the contract," there is no
exhaustion requirement, and the contractor may go at once to the courts.
Specialty Assembly & Packing Co., Inc. v. United States, 174 Ct. C1. 153,
355 F.2d 554 (1966).

rule of judicial self-restraint; the contractor is contractually bound
by the "Disputes" clause to pursue the prescribed administrative
appeals procedure, and he has therefore surrendered the right to
take his claim to court until that procedure has been followed.
Therefore, if the contractor fails to appeal an adverse decision by
the contracting officer to the appeals board the court will not consider his claim. 15 Furthermore, for the purpose of having his claim
considered on the merits by the court, it is not enough merely that
at the time when he appeals to the court the contractor no longer
has any administrative recourse. Since the contractor has contractually engaged to follow the disputes procedure, that procedure
must be followed to the letter before the court will consider his
claim. Thus, the contractor is barred from recovery in court if his
appeal to the board from the final decision of the contracting officer is not taken within the prescribed thirty days, 16 just as he is
barred if he never appeals to the board at all, although in both
cases it could be said that his administrative remedies have been
"exhausted," since after thirty days the contracting officer's decision becomes final and the contractor thereafter has no further
administrative recourse because the board will not hear his claim.
That the court's exhaustion requirement is in fact contractually
based, and that the disputes procedure-including the thirty day
time limit on appeals-must be pursued completely before the
court may afford relief are clearly demonstrated by the following
language from the opinion of the Court of Claims in Sol 0. Schles17
inger v. United States:
Ever since United States v. Blair, 321 U.S. 730 (1944),
it has been established doctrine that literal adherence to
the terms of the "Disputes" clause is essential to the disposition of all questions "arising under" a standard government contract. Typically, this clause provides for an ini-

tial resolution of contract disputes through a contracting
officer's determination. Further, it affords a contractor
the opportunity to challenge such determinations through
the offices of an administrative [board] hearing. Fulfillment of each of these requisites is essential in order to insure judicial review; where such compliance cannot be
shown, then there exists a jurisdictional void which we
are not at liberty to ignore. And in the same manner that
the exhaustion of administrative remedies operates as a
15. See, e.g., United States v. Joseph A. Holpuch, 328 U.S. 234 (1946);
United States v, Blair, 321 U.S. 730 (1943); United States v. Callahan
Walker Const. Co., 317 U.S. 56 (1942); United States v. Ulvedal, 372 F.2d
31 (8th Cir. 1967); Sol 0. Schlesinger v. United States, 181 Ct. C1. 21,
383 F.2d 1004 (1967); American Marine Upholstery Co. v. United States,
170 Ct. Cl. 564, 345 F.2d 577 (1965).
16. Sol 0. Schlesinger v. United States 181 Ct. Cl. 21, 383 F.2d 1004
(1967); Automatic Screw Products Co. v. United States, 145 Ct. Cl. 94,
169 F. Supp. 951 (1959); Happel v. United States, 176 F. Supp. 787 (E.D.
Mo. 1959), aff'd, 279 F.2d 88 (8th Cir. 1960); Poloron Products, Inc. v.
United States, 126 Ct. Cl. 816 (1953).
17. 181 Ct. Cl. 21, 383 F.2d 1004 (1967).
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sine qua non of our contract jurisdiction, so also does
"timeliness" in appealing a contracting officer's determination serve as the 8 source of the administrative appeal
board's j urisiction. 1
Thus dire consequences attend a contractor's failure to appeal to
the board within thirty days of receiving the contracting officer's
decision: further consideration of the merits of his claim, either
administratively or in the courts, is precluded. 9
II.

DISCRETION TO WAIVE THE THIRTY DAY TIME-LImIT

A. The Tapper and Maney Decisions
The various boards of contract appeals have consistently held
that an appeal to them taken after thirty days from receipt of the
contracting officer's final decision cannot be considered and that
20
they have no discretion to waive the timeliness requirement.
However, in two recent opinions, Maney Aircrafts Parts, Inc. v.
United States" and Monroe M. Tapper and Associates v. United
States, 22 the Court of Claims has held that boards of contract appeals do have discretion to waive the thirty-day rule.
In Maney Aircraft the contractor had been "terminated for default" by the government, under the authority conferred by the
"Default" clause in the contract. 23 A telegram giving notice of the
18. Id. at 27, 383 F.2d at 1007 (emphasis added).
19. Although the court will not consider the merits of a claim by a
contractor who failed to take appeal to the board within thirty days, the
contractor is of course free to appeal the dismissal for untimeliness of
his claim by the board. The court will rule as to whether the appeal was
timely according to the thirty day requirement of the "Disputes" clause.
Since the Court of Claims considers that the timeliness of an appeal under
the "Disputes" clause is a question of law, it will consider that issue de
novo. See, e.g., Poloron Products, Inc. v. United States, 126 Ct. Cl. 816,
116 F. Supp. 588 (1953).
20. See, e.g., Maney Aircraft Parts, Inc., ASBCA No. 14563, 72-1 BCA
Par. 9449 (1972); Maitland Brothers, ASBVA No. 6607, 66-1 BCA Par. 5416
(1966); Piracci Construction Co., ASBCA No. 10736, 66-1 BCA Par. 5324
(1966); Mann Construction Co., ASBCA No. 9758, 1964 BCA Par. 4125
(1964); Keenan Pipe and Supply Co., ASBCA No. 7873, 1962 BCA Par.
3320 (1962).
21. 453 F.2d 1260 (Ct.Cl. 1972).
22. 458 F.2d 66 (Ct. Cl.1972).
23. 32 C.F.R. § 7-103.11. The "Default" clause sets forth the government's remedies in case of a breach of the contract by the contractor. It
therefore has the effect of rendering a breach by the contractor a dispute
"arising under the contract," where the contracting officer has exercised
his termination power under this clause. See footnote 2, supra and accompanying text. Conversely, an unjustified "termination for default" is not a
breach on the government's part, because of a provision in the "Default"
clause which automatically converts an unjustified termination for "de-

default termination (which constituted a final 'decision of the contracting officer) was delivered at the contractor's place of business
on a Saturday, to an elderly accountant who was one of the contractor's employees. The telegram was not seen by any officer of
the corporate contractor until the Monday following. Although
the contractor was not open for business on Saturdays, the Court
of Claims upheld the board's finding that receipt of the telegram
for the purpose of calculating the thirty day period for appeal
had occurred on Saturday, because the telegram had been receipted
by one of the contractor's employees at that time. The contractor
mailed its notice of appeal thirty-one days from the Saturday on
which it had received the telegram. The Armed Services Board
of Contract Appeals dismissed the appeal as untimely.2 4 The contractor thereupon appealed the dismissal to the Court of Claims,
contending that as a matter of law his appeal had not been untimely. The court upheld the board's finding of untimeliness, but
went on to state that the board had discretion to waive the thirtyday provision and that such discretionary waiver should have been
considered in the present case:
Although we have held that [in this case] we cannot overturn the Board's finding of untimeliness, we do feel that
the Board has leeway to find that the 30-day provision
should be considered tolled or waived. While we do not
hold that the Board must exercise its discretion favorably
to plaintiff, we think that it should consider 'that possibility
squarely and not simply deem itself powerless to
25
act.
Accordingly, the court suspended its proceedings in the case for
ninety days, 26 in order to give the contractor opportunity to petition the board for a discretionary waiver.
Within a few months of the Maney Aircraft decision, the Court
of Claims reached similar conclusions in the case of Monroe M.
Tapper and Associates v. United States.2 T Tapper had entered into
a construction contract with the Post Office Department, but all
the work under the contract was being done by Tapper's subcontractor, Granger. Granger requested the contracting officer to
render a final decision on some matter of controversy that had
arisen during performance. Tapper ratified this request by failing
to object to Granger's authority to make it on Tapper's behalf after
having been informed by Granger that such request had been
fault" into one "for the convenience of the government." 32 C.F.R.
§ 7-103.11(e). Therefore, a claim arising from the government's wrongful
"default termination" is one "arising under the contract" and the "Disputes" procedure must be followed. See, e.g., Sol 0. Schlesinger v. United
States, 181 Ct. Cl. 21, 383 F.2d 1004 (1967).
24. 453 F.2d at 1261.
25. 453 F.2d at 1263.
26. See note 13 and accompanying text supra.
27. 458 F.2d 66 (Ct. Cl. 1972).
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made.28 Although the government informed Granger that such requests should be made by Tapper himself, the contracting officer
nevertheless accepted the request from Granger, considered the
claim therein, and rendered a "final decision." Granger believed,
although he was not in privity with the government, that notice
of rendition of the final decision would be sent to him as well as
to Tapper, since he rather than Tapper had made the request for
the final decision. However, notice was sent only to Tapper. The
notice was received by Tapper's office on January 16. Tapper himself was on vacation when the notice arrived, and he did not return until the following week. During Tapper's absence his secretary misfiled the notice, and Tapper consequently was not aware
that a final decision had been rendered until February 20, when
Granger, who had finally discovered this fact through inquiry, so
informed him. Tapper thereupon belatedly dispatched his notice
of appeal. Both Tapper and Granger had expected that notice of
the final decision would be sent to Granger, and that Granger
would then file a timely appeal on Tapper's behalf.29 Nevertheless, the board dismissed Tapper's appeal as untimely, and rejected
Tapper's contention that the board had power to waive the thirtyday requirement and that it should do so in this case. 0 Tapper appealed the dismissal to the Court of Claims. As in Maney Aircraft,
the court held that the board had discretionary power to waive
untimeliness, and since the board had refused to exercise such discretion the court suspended its proceedings in the case to allow
Tapper to go back to the board to seek a discretionary waiver. 1
B. Conflict Between the Court of Claims and the Appeals Boards
It should not be expected that the boards of contract appeals
will wholeheartedly accept the view put forward by the Court of
Claims in Tapper and Maney Aircraft that the boards can and
should consider discretionarily waiving the thirty-day requirement.
Two decisions of the Armed Services Board of Contract Appeals
(ASBCA), one rendered some years before Tapper and Maney Aircraft were decided by the Court of Claims 32 and the other rendered
28. Monroe M. Tapper and Associates, PODBCA No. 349, 70-1 BCA
Par. 8255 (1970).

29. Boards of Contract Appeals have taken jurisdiction of appeals by

subcontractors when submitted in the name of the prime contractor. See,
e.g., TRW, Inc. ASBCA No. 11373, 66-2 BCA Par. 5882 (1966); The Harris
Coal Co., ASBCA No. 1263, 58-1 BCA Par. 1688 (1958).
30. PODBCA No. 349, 70-1 BCA Par. 8255, at 38,376 (1970).
31. 458 F.2d at 71.
32. Maitland Brothers, ASBCA No. 6607, 66-1 BCA Par. 5416 (1966).

afterwards,13 indicate that the boards probably will not assume the
power to discretionarily waive the thirty-day provision, despite
the opinions of the Court of Claims ascribing that power to them.
The earlier ASBCA decision was Maitland Brothers.34 In that
case, the mother of the attorney who was handling the contractor's
claim died during the thirty-day appeal period. The attorney went
away to the funeral and consequently the appeal was filed late.
The board promptly dismissed the appeal as untimely, 3" and the
contractor appealed the dismissal to the Court of Claims. The
court did not write an opinion, but merely ordered a temporary suspension to allow the contractor to go back to the board,"' stating in
the order that the board had discretion to waive the untimeliness,
thus anticipating its later holdings in Maney Aircraft and Tapper.
The contractor accordingly petitioned the board to retake jurisdiction of the appeal and consider a waiver. The board did retake jurisdiction, but denied that it had power to waive the thirty-day requirement and again dismissed the appeal for untimeliness.8 7
The second significant ASBCA decision came in response to
the Court of Claims opinion in Maney Aircraft.38 In Maney Aircraft, it will be recalled, the court suspended its proceedings to allow the contractor to seek a discretionary waiver from the board.
The contractor returned to the board, but the board (ASBCA), in
a decision rendered two weeks after the Court of Claims issued its
opinion in Tapper,39 expressly rejected the view put forth by the
Court of Claims in Maney Aircraft and Tapper, denied that it had
the discretion which the court had expected it would exercise, and
40
dismissed the contractor's claim for the second time.
Although the ASBCA, as demonstrated by the Maitland and
Maney Aircraft cases, clearly does not believe that it has discretion
to waive the thirty-day requirement, the Corps of Engineers Board
of Contract Appeals on the other hand has in a recent decision apparently accepted the view of the Court of Claims. In West Coast
Dredging, Inc.,41 the contractor, through sheer inadvertance, filed
33.
(1972).
34.
35.
36.

Maney Aircraft Parts, Inc., ASBCA No. 14363, 72-1 BCA Par. 9449
ASBCA No. 6607, 66-1 BCA Par. 5416 (1966).
61-1 BCA Par. 3073 (1966).
171 Ct. Cl. (1965). See notes 11 and 13 and accompanying text

supra.
37. 66-1 BCA Par. 5416 (1966). No appeal from this dismissal is recorded.
38. Maney Aircraft Parts, Inc. v. United States, 453 F.2d 1260 (Ct. Cl.
1972). See text accompanying notes 21-26 supra.
39. Monroe M. Tapper and Associates v. United States, 458 F.2d 66
(Ct. Cl. 1972). See text accompanying notes 27-30 supra. No board decision on the Tapper claim subsequent to the Court of Claims opinion has
yet been reported.
40. Maney Aircraft Parts, Inc., ASBCA No. 14363, 72-1 BCA Par. 9449
(1972).
41. ENGBCA No. 3254, 72-1 BCA Par. 9461 (1972).
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his appeal after thirty days from the final decision of the contracting officer. The board dismissed the appeal as untimely, but said,
citing Maney Aircraft and Tapper, that the appeal was dismissed
because the board had found no extenuation in this case which
would lead it to waive the thirty-day requirement. Thus it can be
inferred that the Corps of Engineers Board agrees with the Court
of Claims, believing that untimeliness can be waived by a contract
42
appeals board.
Although the Corps of Engineers Board thus apparently agrees
with the Court of Claims in this matter, it is more significant that
the ASBCA does not agree. ASBCA decides far more cases than
the other boards, and it is more likely that the other boards will follow the ASBCA than that they will follow the Corps of Engineers
43
Board.
C.

The Position Taken by the ASBCA is Correct-The Board Cannot Waive the Thirty-Day Requirement

In holding in the Maney Aircraft and Tapper cases that a contract appeals board had the power to waive the thirty-day requirement the Court of Claims overlooked the fact that this requirement
is not a rule established by the boards themselves, but is rather a
contractual engagement made by the contractor. In the Tapper
opinion, the court cited Schacht v. United States4 4 as support for
its conclusion. 45 The United States Supreme Court had held in
Schacht that it had the power to waive a rule that petitions for
certiorari must be filed within thirty days of the judgment of the
lower court from which review is sought. However, the thirty-day
rule in Schacht was a rule which the Supreme Court itself had
promulgated. The ASBCA in its Maney Aircraft decision distinguished the situation in Schacht from that in government contract
law, where the timeliness requirement is a provision of the Disputes clause 46 and is therefore a term of the agreement between
the parties:
42. Gilbert Cuneo reported that members of the Engineering Board
informed him in conversation that in their decision in West Coast Dredg-

ing, Inc. they had in fact followed the views set forth by the Court of
Claims in Maney Aircraft Parts,Inc. v. United States and Monroe M. Tapper
and Associates v. United States, Note, 14 GOVERNMENT CONTRACTOR Par.
216 (1972).
43. See Shedd, Disputes and Appeals: The Armed Services Board of
Contract Appeals, 29 LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS 39, 41

44.

398 U.S. 58 (1970).

45.

458 F.2d at 68.

46.

See text accompanying notes 3-7 supra.

(1964).

In the Schacht case the court held that a rule which it had
written was not jurisdictional and that it had the authority
to waive the time limit which it had written into its rule.
The instant case does not depend on a time limit in a
Board Rule. It instead depends on a time limit in a contract clause which was not written by the Board but
47 which
was instead a contractual agreement of both parties.
Only the parties to a contract can have the power to waive an obligation set up by their agreement. Although contract appeals
boards are government organs, they do not have the status of a
party; the procuring agency, as represented by the contracting officer, is a party to the contract, but the contract appeals board is
4
not. 8

Two earlier Court of Claims cases, Moran Brothers, Inc. v.
United States49 and Burnett Construction Co. v. United States,5 0
were cited by the court in Tapper and Maney Aircraft as authority
for the view that the appeals boards can waive the thirty-day provision. These cases, however, merely show that the contracting
officer, as a party to the contract, may by words or conduct waive
the timeliness provision. 1 In the Moran Brothers case, the contract's Disputes clause contained the usual thirty-day provision,
but in his final decision the contracting officer in effect informed
the contractor that he would have sixty days in which to appeal.
The court decided the case on the grounds that as a matter of law
the contractor's appeal was not untimely; however, it proceeded
to observe that the thirty-day provision could be waived by actions
of the contracting officer:
Whether the basic rationale be grounded upon estoppel or
waiver, a party to a contract may generally 52dispense with
procedural requirements made for its benefit.
47.

Maney Aircraft Parts, Inc., ASBCA No. 14363, 72-1 BCA Par. 9449
See also, Note, 14 GOVERNMENT CONTRACTOR Par. 163

at 43,887 (1972).

(1972).
48. United States v. McMullen, 222 U.S. 460, 470 (1912); Shedd, Disputes and Appeals: The Armed Services Board of Contract Appeals, 29
LAW

AND

CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS 39, 68 (1964).

Although the appeals

boards are the designated representative of the head of the contracting
agency for the purpose of deciding disputes, their authority to hear appeals
comes from both the government (as a party) and the contractor,by their
agreement to the "Disputes" clause as a term of the contract. They are
therefore not the agent of either party.
49. 171 Ct. Cl. 245, 346 F.2d 590 (1965).
50. 186 Ct. Cl. 953 (1968) (order).
51. In previous decisions, appeals boards had held that even a contracting officer could not extend the thirty-day period after it had expired.
See, e.g., Maitland Brothers, ASBCA No. 6607, 66-1 BCA Par. 5416 (1966);
Refer Construction Co., IBCA No. 209, 60-2 BCA Par. 2831 (160); The
Tire Mart, ASBCA No. 5671, 60-1 BCA Par. 2582; Aero Electronics Co.,
ASBCA No. 4985, 59-1 BCA Par. 2183 (1959).
52. 171 Ct. Cl. at 250, 346 F.2d at 593. It cannot be said with certainty,
however, that a contracting officer can waive untimeliness absent some element of estoppel. It has been said that a government official cannot waive
a vested contract right without consideration flowing to the government.
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In the Burnett case, the contractor appealed after thirty days, but
at the hearing before the General Services Administration Board
of Contract Appeals the government failed to raise the issue of untimeliness, and the appeal was dismissed on the merits. When the
contractor appealed to the court, the government moved for a dismissal because of the contractor's failure to comply with the thirtyday provision. The court, citing Moran Brothers,5 3 denied the
motion, ruling that the untimeliness was waived when the objection was not raised before the board. 54 Thus in Burnett, as in
Moran Brothers, the waiver arose through the actions of one-in
this case the government's trial attorney-who represented the
procuring agency in its capacity as a party to the contract. While
these cases indicate that an official representing the government
in its capacity as a party to the contract may be in a position to
waive provisions thereof, it does not follow that the board, which
is not a party to the contract, and whose authority derives solely
from the contract,5 5 can without the consent of both parties abrogate obligations which they have agreed upon. 56
III.
A.

THE DILEMMA

OF THE COURT OF CLAIMS

The Exhaustion Obstacle

When the Court of Claims suspends its proceedings to allow a
contractor to seek a discretionary waiver of untimeliness from an
See, e.g., United States v. American Sales Corp., 27 F.2d 389 (1928). On
the other hand, in Monroe M. Tapper and Associates v. United States, 458
F.2d 66 (Ct. Cl. 1972), the Court of Claims stated that the government's
rights under the "Disputes" clause do not "vest" until the board refuses to
take jurisdiction because of untimeliness.
53 171 Ct. Cl. 245, 346 F.2d 590 (1965).
54. 186 Ct. Cl. at 954.
55. See note 7 supra.
56. Sol 0. Schlesinger v. United States, 181 Ct. Cl. 21, 383 F.2d 1004
(1967), cited in Maney Aircraft, is the only prior Court of Claims case in
which appears the notion that the appeals board, as opposed to the contracting officer or the trial attorney, can waive the thirty-day provision.
However, even in the Schlesinger case it is unclear whether the court really
believed that the boards had such power; although at one point the court
remarked that it could not be said "that the Board abused its discretion in
this instance in adhering to the thirty-day requirement," 181 Ct. Cl. at 28,
383 F.2d at 1008, the court said at another point in contradiction that untimely appeals "cannot be entertained," 181 Ct. Cl. at 28, 383 F.2d at 1008,
citing Maitland Brothers, ASBCA No. 6607, 66-1 BCA Par. 5416 (1966). In
earlier cases, the court apparently did not feel that the contractor had recourse to a discretionary waiver from the board after filing a late appeal,
see, e.g., Automatic Screw Products Co. v. United States, 145 Ct. Cl. 94
(1959); Poloron Products, Inc. v. United States, 126 Ct. Cl. 816, 116 F.
Supp. 588 (1953).

appeals board, and the appeals board subsequently denies that it
has discretion and again dismisses the appeal without reaching the
merits, the question arises whether the contractor has, in or
through the Court of Claims, any further recourse. The boards'
ability to decline the suggestion of the Court of Claims to exercise
discretion is a consequence of the disability of the Court of Claims
to remand. 57 Nevertheless, that the ASBCA refused to follow the
suggestion of the Court of Claims in such an instance disturbed
the dissenting board member in the Maney Aircraft58 case, who
was led to remark:
To refuse to hear Maney's application, seasonably made
under the Court's order [suspending proceedings], as the
majority does, is to me an impermissible disruption of the
administrative judicial process and a threat to the functional equilibrium between the contract Appeals Boards
and the courts. 59
It is to be expected that such disruptions will occur again, particularly if the other appeals boards follow the example set by
the ASBCA. If the board in a similar case refuses to follow the
court's suggestion, could the contractor then return to the court
for a judgment on the merits? That such a course is possible might
be inferred from the opinion of the United States Supreme Court
inUnited States v. Anthony Grace & Sons, Inc.60 which was quoted
at length by the dissenting board member in Maney Aircraft.6' In
Anthony Grace, the contractor had appealed to the Court of Claims
from the ASBCA's dismissal of his appeal for untimeliness. The
court ruled that, as a matter of law, the contractor's appeal had
not been untimely.6 2 Rather than suspending its proceedings to
allow the contractor to return to the board for a decision on the
merits, the court assigned the claim to its own trial commissioner
for an evidentiary hearing, from which disposition the government
appealed. Following the principles which it had laid down in
United States v. Bianchi & Co.,6 s the Supreme Court held that
57. See note 13 and accompanying text supra. One authority has
suggested that the board is bound by the determination of the court that
it does have discretion to waive the thirty-day provision, because the issue
is one of law, and according to the "Disputes" clause, the decisions of the
board on questions of law are not final. See Note, 14 GOVERNMENT CONTRACTOR Par. 179 (1972).
This reasoning is faulty, however; it does not
follow that because rulings of the board on law questions are not binding
on the court rulings of the court on law questions are binding on the board.
58. Maney Aircraft Parts, Inc. ASBCA No. 14363, 72-1 BCA Par. 9449
(1972).
59. Id at 43,888.
60. 384 U.S. 424 (1966).
61. 72-1 BCA at 43,889. The dissenter quoted language which appeared in both Anthony Grace and United States v. Carlo Bianchi and Co.,
Inc., 373 U.S. 709, 717-18 (1963), citing Bianchi.
62. Anthony Grace & Sons, Inc. v. United States, 170 Ct. Cl. 688, 709,
345 F.2d 808, 821 (1965).
63. 373 U.S. 709 (1963). See notes 10 and 11, supra and accompanying text.
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where the administrative record is inadequate-in this case because the board had not reached the merits of the claim-the court
could not make its own findings, but instead must suspend to allow
the board to make such findings as may be necessary. The court
had contended that this procedure would prove futile if the board
subsequently failed or refused to consider the claim on the merits.
In reply to this argument, the Supreme Court remarked:
When the Board fails to reach and decide an issue because
it disposes of the appeal on another ground-here the untimeliness of the appeal-which the Court of Claims later
rejects, there is no sound reason to presume that the Board
will not promptly and fairly deal with the merits of the
undecided issue if given the chance to do so.
Another argument advanced by the Court of Claims is that
it lacks authority to remand the case and the Board may
refuse to consider it again. At this stage of the proceedings this fear may be dismissed as a hypothetical one.
There will be, time enough later, if this fear ever materializes, to consider whether the reviewing court would
then be authorized to make its own record. In this regard
it should be noted that, in Bianchi, supra, we suggested
one way of dealing with this problem: 'And in any case
in which the department failed to remedy the particular
substantive or procedural defect or inadequacy, the sanction of judgment for
64 the contractor would always be available for the court.'
Thus the Anthony Grace opinion suggests that, where after a suspension of proceedings by the court the board refuses to consider
the claim on the merits, the court may then make findings itself
and render judgment.
It would therefore seem, initially, that the Court of Claims could
pursue this course after the ASBCA refused to exercise discretion
to waive the thirty-day requirement in the Maney Aircraft case.
However, there is one paramount distinction between the respective situation in Maney Aircraft and Anthony Grace; in Anthony
Grace there was no problem of exhaustion. Exhaustion, it will be
recalled, is the somewhat misleading term which the Court of
Claims has used to signify the contractor's contractual obligation
under the Disputes clause to pursue the procedures set forth therein for all claims "arising under the contract." 5 The term also signifies the contractor's agreement, by the Disputes clause, that the
final decision of the contracting officer becomes "final and conclusive" unless appealed from within thirty days. In Anthony
Grace, the Court of Claims ruled that as a matter of law the con64.
65.

384 U.S. at 430-32.
See text accompanying notes 14-19 supra.

tractor's appeal was timely with respect to the thirty-day provision
of the Disputes clause.6 6 Since the contractor had thus complied
with the requirements of the Disputes clause, there was no failure
to exhaust, whether or not the board considered his claim on the
merits.67 The only problem for the court in that case was that
since the board had not considered the merits of the claim, there
was no record for review. If after suspension of proceedings the
board still refused to consider the merits, the court would then
have been free to make findings itself and proceed to judgment,
since compliance with the contractual provisions that are a precondition of the contractor's right to have his claim considered in the
court--exhaustion-had been accomplished. Conversely, in the
Maney Aircraft and Tapper cases it was undisputed that the contractor had not complied with the Disputes clause thirty-day provision, and had consequently failed to exhaust. Therefore, when
the board refused to consider waiving the exhaustion requirement,
there was not merely an inadequacy of the administrative record
(which, as suggested by the Supreme Court in Anthony Grace,
might finally be remedied by judgment following a de novo hearing in the Court of Claims), but also a failure to exhaust, which
the court is not at liberty to ignore. Thus, when in Maney Aircraft the ASBCA refused to consider waiving the untimeliness of
the contractor's appeal in spite of the suggestion by the Court of
Claims that it do so, the contractor could not for that reason simply
return to the Court of Claims and have it consider his claim and
render a judgment. 68
B. JudicialConsiderationWithout Exhaustion
Although under the doctrine of exhaustion, a contractor is not
entitled to judicial consideration of his claim unless he has complied with the disputes procedure, the courts have often said that
66.

170 Ct. Cl. at 709, 345 F.2d at 821.

67. Cases cited note 15 supra.
68. The same objections may be raised against use of the procedure
set forth in Court of Claims Rule 168(e), 28 U.S.C. (1969):
At the end of the period fixed by an order staying proceedings,
if the board . . . has not rendered a decision on the matter referred to it by the order, the court . . . may initiate proceedings

essential to the entry of a proper judgment.
Another solution which suggests itself would be for the court to compel
the board to exercise discretion to waive the thirty-day provision by
issuance of a writ of mandamus addressed to the board, under the All
Writs Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1651 (1964). However, it is doubtful that the All
Writs Act confers power on the Court of Claims to issue mandamus, see
WEST'S FEDERAL PRACTICE MANUAL §§ 1833-35 (2d ed. 1970). But see Kamen Soap Products Co., Inc. v. United States, 124 Ct. Cl. 519, 110 F. Supp.
430 (1953); Jaffe, Remand Powers of the Court of Claims, 55 GEo. L.J. 444,
448 (1966). The District Courts, on the other hand, definitely have the
power to issue mandamus, under 28 U.S.C. § 1361 (1962). Therefore, a contractor with a claim of less than $10,000 appealing from an appeals board's
dismissal of his appeal for untimeliness might have brighter prospects in
seeking review by the District Courts under 28 U.S.C. § 1346 (1966), rather than going to the Court of Claims.
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"where the administrative procedure is shown to be inadequate or
unavailable" the contractor is not required to "exhaust his administrative remedies" and may go directly to court.6 9 Of course,
since the "administrative procedure," as set forth in the Disputes
clause, never varies, it is no more inadequate or unavailable in any
given case than it ever is; in the cases where exhaustion is excused
by reason of such inadequacy or unavailability, the fault lies with
some government official-either the contracting officer or the
board members-not with the disputes procedure itself.
There are two reported cases in which the appeals board was at
fault, C.J. Langenfelder & Sons, Inc. v. United States0 and Southeastern Oil Florida, Inc. v. United States. 71 In Langenfelder, the
appeals board had rendered a decision favorable to the contractor,
but the government did not pay on the claim, and on a motion by
the contracting officer filed over a year after its original decision,
the board 'decided to reconsider the case. The contractor refused
to participate in the reconsideration and went instead to the Court
of Claims. The court held that the contractor was excused from
"exhausting his administrative remedies," because the board had
not begun its reconsideration within a reasonable time.7 2 In Southeastern Oil, after the contractor had duly appealed to the board,
the government's attorney moved for a dismissal, on the grounds
that the dispute was not one within the scope of the Disputes
clause.73. When after two years the board still had not ruled on
the motion, the contractor sought review of the contracting officer's
final decision in the Court of Claims. The court held that the contractor's failure to exhaust was, under the circumstances, no bar to
the court's jurisdiction.74 It should be noted that in both of these
cases the contractor had taken every affirmative action required of
him by the Disputes clause. The principle of the cases seems to be
that where the contractor has diligently followed the disputes pro69. See, e.g., United States v. Anthony Grace & Sons, Inc., 384 U.S.
424 (1966); United States v. Holpuch, 328 U.S. 234 (1946); Universal Ecsco
Corp. v. United States, 181 Ct. Cl. 10, 385 F.2d 427 (1967); New York
Shipbuilding Corp. v. United States, 180 Ct. Cl. 446, 385 F.2d 427 (1967);
C.J. Langenfelder & Sons, Inc. v. United States, 169 Ct. Cl. 465, 341 F.2d
600 (1965); Dale Construction Co. v. United States, 168 Ct. Cl. 692 (1964);
Garod Radio Corp. v. United States, 158 Ct. Cl. 596, 307 F.2d 945 (1962);
Alfred C. Reinking v. United States, 151 Ct. Cl. 307, 283 F.2d 527 (1960);
Southeastern Oil Florida, Inc. v. United States, 127 Ct. Cl. 480, 115 F. Supp.
198 (1953).
70. 169 Ct. Cl. 465, 341 F.2d 600 (1965).
71. 127 Ct. Cl. 480, 115 F. Supp. 198 (1953).
72. 169 Ct. Cl. at 474, 341 F.2d at 605.
73. See note 5 and accompanying text supra.
74. 127 Ct. Cl. at 485, 115 F. Supp. at 201.

cedure, the court will not require him to wait indefinitely for the
board to make a final disposition. It is therefore unlikely that a
contractor who has failed to follow the disputes procedure, as did
the contractors in Maney Aircraft and Tapper, could successfully
argue that the mere refusal of the board to consider waiving that
failure constitutes inadequacy or unavailability that abrogates the
contractual duty of exhaustion.
In other cases the exhaustion requirement has been excused
for some fault by the contracting officer.7 5 In Alfred C. Reinking
v. United States, 76 for example, the Court of Claims held that if
the failure of the contractor to exhaust is due to confusion and delay caused by the contracting officer, the failure is excused and the
contractor may go to court. In a number of cases failure to exhaust was excused where the contracting officer refused or failed
within a reasonable time to issue a final decision after request by
the contractor. 77 Considering that the contracting officer represents the government in its proprietary capacity as a party to the
contract, it could be said that the underlying principle in these
cases is simply the rule of contract law that where one party to a
contract hinders or prevents the other from performing an obligation arising under the contract performance of that obligation is excused. 78 The doctrine of prevention as such has been successfully
invoked against the government by contractors in several cases. 79
Therefore, in a case where the contractor, because of some fault
on the part of the contracting officer, has failed to file an appeal
to the board within thirty days of the contracting officer's final decision and his claim is accordingly dismissed by the board for untimeliness, rather than appeal to the Court of Claims on the
grounds that the board should exercise discretion to waive the un75. See, e.g., New York Shipbuilding Corp. v. United States, 180 Ct.

Cl. 446, 385 F.2d 427 (1967); Dale Construction Co. v. United States, 168
Ct. Cl. 692 (1964); Garod Radio Corp. v. United States, 158 Ct. Cl. 596, 307
F.2d 945 (1962); Alfred C. Reinking v. United States, 151 Ct. Cl. 307, 283
F.2d 527 (1960).
76. 151 Ct. Cl. 307, 283 F.2d 527 (1960).
77. See, e.g., Universal Ecsco Corp. v. United States, 181 Ct. Cl. 10,
385 F.2d 427 (1967); New York Shipbuilding Corp. v. United States,
180 Ct. Cl. 446, 384 F.2d 421 (1967); H.B. Zachary Co. v. United States,
170 Ct. Cl. 115, 344 F.2d 352 (1965); Oliver-Finnie Co. v. United States,
150 Ct. Cl. 189, 278 F.2d 498 (1960); Maxan Dress Corp. v. United States,
126 Ct. Cl. 434, 115 F. Supp. 439 (1953).
78. RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS § 295 (1932):
If a promisor prevents or hinders the occurrence of a condition,
or the performance of a return promise, and the condition would
have occurred or the performance of the return promise been
rendered except for such prevention or hindrance, the condition is
excused....
79. See, e.g., United Engineering & Contracting Co. v. United States,
47 Ct. Cl. 489, aff'd, 234 U.S. 236 (1913); Gardner Displays Co. v. United
States, 171 Ct. Cl. 497, 346 F.2d 585 (1965); Dale Construction Co. v. United
States, 168 Ct. Cl. 692 (1964). In general, the government is bound by its
contracts to the same extent and in the same way as private persons, and

the usual rules of contract law may be invoked against the government,
Foster Co. v. United States, 128 Ct. Cl. 291, 120 F. Supp. 758 (1954).
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timeliness, the contractor should instead argue to the court that
his failure to exhaust is excused because of prevention. The advantages of this argument are twofold: First, (assuming he proves
his allegations) the contractor thereby avoids a return to the board,
which will probably refuse to consider a waiver in any event; second, if the court accepts his contentions the exhaustion requirement is excused, and the contractor may then proceed to have his
claim decided 'de novo by the court, without having to return to the
board for a decision on the merits. This argument might have succeeded, for instance, in the Tapper case, where confusion caused
by the contracting officer was at least partly responsible for the
contractor's failure to file an appeal within thirty days.80
IV.

CONCLUSION

One solution to the stalemate presently existing between the
ASBCA and the Court of Claims, on the question of whether the
contract appeals boards have power to consider discretionary waivers of the thirty-day provision, would be amendment of the Disputes clause to expressly provide for discretionary waivers. This
the concurring judge in Tapper called for:
What evil is averted if an appeal filed in 31 days is not
heard on the merits?
This is the sort of pettifogging controversy that causes intelligent people to prefer other careers over service on the
bench. If the Boards cannot find a rational and workable
line under the existing clause, it is to be hoped the mysterious processes that generate standard Government contract clauses may be set to work to gestate a substitute or
amendment.8 '
The wisdom of so amending the Disputes clause to introduce discretion, however, is not manifest. To do so would be to sacrifice certainty without increasing equity. It is hard to conceive a situation
where, under the present system, a contractor could fail to file a
timely appeal and yet be without fault. Since the contracting officer is presently authorized to extend the time for appeal if the ex2
tension is granted before the initial thirty-day period has expired,
8
a contractor in a case like Maney Aircraft, whose attorney is tem80.

See text accompanying notes 27-29 supra.

81. Monroe M. Tapper and Associates v. United States, 458 F.2d 66,
72 (Ct. Cl. 1972).
82. See, e.g., Refer Construction Co., IBCA No. 209, 60-2 BCA Par.

2831 (1960); Aero Electronics Co., ASBCA No. 4985, 59-1 BCA Par. 2183

(1959); cf. Ban Electronics, Inc., ASBCA No. 16158, 71-2 BCA Par. 9070
(1972).
83. See text accompanying notes 23-26 supra.

porarily incapacitated or who for some other reason is not able to
respond promptly, need not be prejudiced. If, on the other hand, the
failure to file a timely appeal is due to confusion caused by the contracting officer, the contractor may be excused from the obligation
of exhaustion by operation of the contract principle of prevention.
Although it has long been argued that the thirty-day time for
appeal is not long enough,8 4 complaints have largely subsided since
passage of regulations8" requiring that the contracting officer's
final decision contain a statement informing the contractor that the
decision becomes final and conclusive unless the contractor files
notice of appeal within thirty days. 86 The disadvantages, which
are readily apparent, of changing the present system to allow discretionary waivers by the appeals boards were remarked by the
dissenting board member in Maney Aircraft:
If, as the Court now proposes, the failure to appeal within
thirty days must be relieved in whatever circumstances
will by an evolutionary process of case-by-case decision be
deemed to require the exercise of the Board's discretion,
no dispute is ever with certainty known to be at an end.
For until an application to the Board, such as appellant
and plaintiff is here permitted to make, and which apparently can be made without time limit, has been heard
and determined by the Board, and reviewed by the Court,
no contracting officer can ever be certain that a decision
has become final. Even if most such applications regarding untimely appeals turn out to be without merit, their
burden on the procuring activities and their counsel as
well as the Boards and consume time and effort better used
in the speedier disposition of timely appeals.
The Court's desire to do substantive justice to every plaintiff, even the laggard contractor who appeals after more
than thirty days, is fully understood.

But it seems . . . a

misplaced concern to sacrifice the beneficial effect of the
existing rule in ending disputes with certainty, to open up
a whole new area of litigation, and induce potentially
widespread disregard of the thirty-day rule of appeals in
order to reach the needs of the few who now fail to observe it.87
It is therefore to be hoped that the Court of Claims will eventually
come to accept the position taken by the ASBCA in the matter of
the discretion of boards of contract appeals to waive the thirtyday provision, rather than that the converse should occur.
WILLIAM BELL

84. See McBride and Wachtel, GOVERNMENT CONTRACTS § 6.90(1)
(1972).
85. See, e.g., 32 C.F.R. § 7-103.12 (1958); Roscoe-Ajax Construction
Co., 458 F.2d 55 (Ct. Cl. 1972).
86. Maney Aircraft arts, Inc., ASBCA No. 14363, 72-1 BCA Par. 9449
(1972); Shedd, Disputes and Appeals: The Armed Services Board of Contract Appeals, 29 LAw & CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS 39, 72 (1964).
87. 72-1 BCA at 43,888 (dissent).

